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DEMOCRACY, EQUALITY, AND THE ROLE OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION
ANTHONY G. SOLARI*
What do lawyers do? To the detriment of the legal profession, the
American public is formulating a decisively negative answer to this ques-
tion. Increasingly, lawyers are seen as self serving "hired guns" more
concerned with the "bottom line" than with the pursuit of justice. One
need only compare, for example, the portrayal of lawyers in "Perry Ma-
son" (however inaccurate that portrayal may have been) to their por-
trayal in "The Verdict" or in "L.A. Law" in order to see just how much
popular perceptions of the profession have changed.' The view that law-
yers are "just a bunch of whores"- as a character in "The Verdict" put
it - is increasingly widespread, and opinion surveys have confirmed sta-
tistically what Hollywood has portrayed dramatically.2
While some undoubtedly take satisfaction in this state of affairs, there
is cause for deep concern here. The public's loss of esteem for the legal
profession reflects a profound loss of faith in our society as a whole. The
legal profession shares in the responsibility for this state of affairs. It has
contributed to the crisis of public confidence by losing sight of the very
purpose which justifies its existence: insuring fairness and equality both
in and before the law. More than an important social function, it is a
sacred trust. This is especially so in a commercial republic like ours,
where the "free market" mechanism has worked to replace civic virtue
* Anthony Solai teaches political science at North Carolina State University and at St.
Mary's College in Raleigh, North Carolina. He received his B.A. from Rutgers University and his
M.A. from Duke University, where he is presently a doctoral candidate. His dissertation research
deals with alienation and meaninglessness in contemporary America. He wishes to thank Frances
Cappelletti for her helpful suggestions and encouragement in the preparation of this essay.
1. It is true that lawyers have not always been viewed in a positive light. For example, John
Donne said in the early seventeenth century: "When sicke with Poetrie, and possest with muse/
Thou wast, and mad, I hop'd; but men which chuse/Law practise for meere gaine, bold soule, re-
pute/Worse then imbrothel'd strumpets prostitute." J. DONNE, SATYRE II in DONNE POETICAL
WORKS, 134 (H.Grierson ed. 1933).
What can be said is that in the last forty years, Americans have changed their perceptions of the
integrity and honesty of the profession as a whole in response to their experience with lawyers who
have been less concerned with right than with the size of their fees. We might add, that disparaging
remarks about the legal profession throughout history probably reflect a similar disillusionment.
2. From the mid 1970's on, an average of only 25% of surveyed adults responded that lawyers
had a very high or high standard of honesty. In 1985 only between 8% and 9% of adults said they
would recommend a legal career to a young man or woman. G. Gallup, The Gallup Poll, Public
Opinion 1985, 226 (1985).
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with the "ethic" of self interest and where public purpose has succumbed
to the anarchy of interest group libertarianism operating in an atmos-
phere of mutual exploitation.
It would be unfair, however, to lay the blame entirely at the door of
the profession. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and a legal
system can only be as good or just as the society of which it is a part. I
will argue in what follows, that the problems of the legal profession are
inseparable from those of society at large, and that our current predica-
ment stems from a lack of public purpose and public spiritedness prop-
erly understood. Furthermore, I will argue that these problems are in
turn caused by a set of fundamental contradictions which underlie our
socio-political order. My argument obviously extends beyond a narrow
focus on the legal profession. This is necessary, however, if the problems
facing the profession are to be properly identified and understood. Only
once this has been accomplished can solutions be explored.
In what follows I will be formulating an argument as to the above
mentioned contradictions and will offer a rough outline of some solu-
tions. In Part I, I will make some brief points about interpreting the
founders. In Part II, I explicate the classical view of political life, con-
trasting it with what the founders' thoughts on politics were which are
presented in Part III. In Part IV, I argue that the founders were moti-
vated by an aristocratic impulse, and in Part V, I place the legal profes-
sion within this group and squarely at the focus of the founders' views on
politics. Part VI examines the role capitalism plays in all of this. At this
point in the essay, I will have occasionally responded to the points made
by James Beckwith in his What Should Lawyers Do? An Essay on Law-
yers, The Free Economy, Redistribution, and Democratic Legitimacy. In
Parts VII and VIII, I take some time for a more detailed examination of
his argument. Part IX consists of a set of proposals for solving some of
the dilemmas and issues discussed in my essay and calls for the legal
profession to closely examine the course it presently seems to be charting.
Before I begin, I would like to make a point or two about the chances
of finding solutions to the profession's problems. It is a difficult task and
given the complexity and depth of the factors involved, I tend to be
somewhat pessimistic as to the probability of success. It seems certain,
however, that our chances of finding solutions will not be improved
through recourse to pietistic homilies about man's ignorance or about the
need for trust in "our Creator" who will, presumably, step in to save
mankind from itself. Such sentiments (which are more appropriate to
the church than to the academy) pass all too easily in current intellectual
discourse. At times tritely sincere, often they are stated for the purpose
of ideologically justifying an existing or desired state of affairs.3
3. On the use of religion in this manner and for some interesting recent examples, see R.
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Man has created the problems he faces and he had better well be capa-
ble of solving them. True enough, man is not omniscient and the recog-
nition of this fact is the hallmark of the truly wise. But even Socrates,
who humbly claimed to have no true "wisdom", knew that his powers of
reason gave him insights into human affairs not shared by most others.4
Socrates believed in the power of these insights to solve some of man's
problems, and his insights have profoundly shaped our world. Solving
the problems we face will be impossible without absolute confidence in
our ability to do so. Recognizing the gaps in man's knowledge is one
thing. Hiding one's head in the sands of ignorance and hoping our
problems will rectify themselves or be solved for us by some deus ex
machina is quite another.'
I. INTERPRETING THE FOUNDERS
Beginnings are crucially important times and this is no less true of
societies than it is of individuals. The problems the legal profession faces
can be traced in substantial part to the founding of the republic, and in
this regard, the triumph of the Federalist's views at the constitutional
convention are especially important.
Discussions about the founders' intentions are perilous undertakings.
The founders were a diverse group of men with differing views on both
the events of their time and the constitution on which they labored.6
Those who speak of the intent of the founders assume a coherence and
agreement in the founders' thoughts that never existed. Nevertheless,
fools rush in where wise men tread with caution. Just what the founders'
intentions were is debatable. However, we do know that they were pos-
sessed of sufficient foresight to see that times would change and that the
constitution they created would have to be vague if it was to remain a
document relevant to future generations.
In speculating on the interpretive arts, James Madison well knew that
which many contemporary observers fail to realize:
But no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every
complex idea or so correct as not to include many equivocally denoting
BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER, & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART 219-49
(1985) [hereinafter BELLAH]. See also D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTION OF CAPITALISM
146-50, 157 (1978).
4. On the insights into human affairs that philosophy gave Plato, see PLATO, THE REPUBLIC
OF PLATO 193-96 (A. Bloom trans. & ed. 1968).
5. In ancient Greek and Roman drama, deities were brought in through the use of stage ma-
chinery to resolve difficult situations. In modem usage, the phrase refers to any artificial or improba-
ble device used to resolve some situation or untangle a plot. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 360 (W. Morris ed. 1981).
6. For a concise statement on the differences between Hamilton and Jefferson - or on the
federalists and anti-federalists, see THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY 123-24 (R. Morris
ed. 1953).
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different ideas .... And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or
less, according to the complexity and novelty of the objects defined.
When the almighty himself condescends to address mankind in their own
language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and
doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.7
When a document is left intentionally vague, as our constitution was,
how much more difficult is the task of knowing the intent of its authors?
This is not to say that we must abandon attempts to understand the
founders or to make use of what they have left us. In doing so, however,
we must be exacting in our use of citation. This -allows those observing
the debate to decide for themselves the correctness of the interpretation.
For example, we should be suspicious when we are told, as a recent
contributor to these pages attempts to tell us,8 that Madison argued
against "redistribution of wealth" through the "abuse of politics" and
that he favored something called "wealth creation in the market."9 No
documentary evidence is offered for these attributions, which later in the
same discussion, serve as an example of something called an "interpre-
tivist" as opposed to a "non-interpretivist" approach to constitutional
law. 1° Given Madison's actual views, this is not surprising. In his dis-
cussions of the Senate in the Federalist Papers,1 Madison made the case
for stable government. Stability is important because one of the
problems instability creates is:
The unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising
and moneyed few over the industrious and uninformed mass of the peo-
ple ... [this is] a harvest reared not by themselves, but by the toils and
cares of the great body of their fellow citizens. This is a state of things in
which it may be said with some truth that the laws are made for the few,
not the many.1
2
Madison recognized that wealth is never "created," especially not by en-
trepreneurs, but has its source in the sweat and toil of the countless peo-
ple who wrest value from nature.13 While Madison did fear the
redistributive passions of the many,14 he also recognized that the unequal
distribution of property was "the most common and durable source of
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 229 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961), (This edition is used
throughout this essay).
8. Beckwith, What Should Lawyers Do? An Essay on Lawyers, The Free Economy, Redistribu-
tion, and Democratic Legitimacy, 16 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1 (1986).
9. Id. at 11.
10. Id. at 20.
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 381 (J. Madison).
12. Id. (emphasis in original).
13. Others have recognized this fact as well, especially Karl Marx. K. MARX, EARLY WRIT-
INGS 259-63, 268, 270-71, 276-77 (R. Livingstone, G. Benton trans. 1975).
14. Shay's Rebellion in Western Massachusetts with its call for debt alleviation and lessening of
property differences troubled Madison and acted as a spur to the constitutional convention.
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faction,"15 and as such one of the greatest dangers to Republican govern-
ment. It was, Madison argued, "the principle task of modern legislatures
to regulate these varied and interfering interests."
' 1 6
In what follows, I will make every effort to be as careful in citation as
scholarship demands.
II. THE CLASSICAL VIEW OF POLITICS
In besting the anti-federalists at the constitutional convention and in
the ensuing debate over ratification, the federalists did more than assure
the creation of a strong federal government. Their victory involved a
rejection of the view of political life left to them by antiquity in favor of a
"new science of politics" based on modern beliefs about the nature of
man and his relationship to the public sphere.1 7 It is from the federalists'
rejection of the classic view of politics that the difficulties of the legal
profession stem. It will be necessary, therefore, to explicate this view in
some detail.
To the ancient Greeks man was a political and social animal. It was,
therefore, man's nature to live in civil society, and Aristotle tells us that
men were not considered fully human unless they participated in the act
of governance. 18 According to Aristotle, those who have no city, no
state, are by nature either too bad or too good; either animals or gods. 9
Participation in society enabled men to become virtuous, and "the excel-
lent or complete human being is the end for which the city exists."2
Since the state was a necessary condition for the fulfillment of human
potential, it was also "both natural and prior to the individual."'" Men,
being rational, would recognize that they were dependent upon the state
if they were to gain the best things life had to offer. This classical under-
standing of the relationship between man and the state included views on
the individual, freedom, and equality that are quite different from our
own. All three can be illuminated through a discussion of the classical
idea of citizenship.
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78, 79 (J. Madison).
16. Id. at 79.
17. I am heavily indebted to the following works and individuals for the views expressed in this
section. It would be at best unfair of me not to acknowledge that in large part, I owe the interpreta-
tion presented here to their influence. McWilliams, On Equality as the Moral Foundation for Com-
munity, in THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 183 (R. Howitz 2d ed. 1979);
McWilliams, Democracy and the Citizen: Community, Dignity, and the Crisis of Contemporary Poli-
tics in America, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION 79 (R. Goldwin & W. Schamberg eds.
1980) [hereinafter Democracy and the Citizen]; R. BAKER, G. POMPER, & W.C. MCWILLIAMS,
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT chs. 1 & 15 (Ist ed. 1983) [hereinafter BAKER].
18. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 28-29 (T.A. Sinclair ed. 1976).
19. Id.
20. Democracy and the Citizen, supra note 17, at 83.
21. ARISTOTLE, supra note 18, at 29.
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"To ancient political science, citizenship came first in the ordering of
democracies."22 The test of the good citizen, Aristotle tells us, is "to
know well how to rule and be ruled."23 In a democratic regime, ruling
means that "each citizen must be able to share in defining the public's
alternatives and have an equal say in what is chosen and for what end."24
In turn, the democratic citizen is ruled by virtue of his acceptance of the
will of the majority.
Accepting majority rule may not always be easy, especially if one feels
the majority is wrong, or if one is part of a powerful minority. We each
accept majority rule because we understand our dependence on our fel-
lows for the good life, and because, as Cary McWilliams has said, we
accept "the principle [of] the political equality of all citizens."25 If other
members of the community are corrupt (i.e., unjust, anti-democratic, or
radically individualistic) or if the political society is misdirected (i.e., its
aim is "only the good of the rulers" or the few), my ability to achieve
"the good life" will be correspondingly hindered.26 Of the three personal
failings mentioned, that of the radical individualist - one who loves his
personal freedom above all and defines it in the modern sense of "doing
as one likes" -presents the greatest danger to republican government be-
cause both anti-democratic and unjust behaviors stem from his all-en-
compassing self love.
Individualism, the clarion call of our era, was recognized by the
ancients as an inevitable part of life.27 Our bodies and our senses remind
us of our separateness from one another. We search for that which
makes us happy and favor those who help us achieve it. The public-
spirited, democratic citizen learns to control his private urges, and tries
to learn "not to confuse [his] private interests with the public good."28
This is a stern requirement, but a necessary one if democracy is to work.
It is in this sense that one must learn to "rule oneself" as a prerequisite
to democratic participation.
Self rule, understood this way, means that "freedom" is not "doing as
one likes." We define it this way, however, because political freedom
does tend to suggest to us that we are, indeed, doing "as we like." This
leads us to privatize our understanding of freedom and associate it with
our personal desires. Democratic citizens, according to Aristotle, must
be educated so as to avoid this confusion of thought.29
22. Democracy and the Citizen, supra note 17, at 80.
23. ARISTOTLE, supra note 18, at 109.
24. Democracy and the Citizen, supra note 17, at 80.
25. Id. at 81.
26. ARISTOTLE, supra note 18, at 115.
27. See, eg., id. at 25-32; BELLAH, supra note 3, at 142-63.
28. BAKER, supra note 17, at 17.
29. On this argument, see Democracy and the Citizen, supra note 17; ARISTOTLE, supra note 18,
at 236-37.
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Present day commentators, taking their cue from the founders, define
freedom in the modem sense of doing as one likes." Liberty is under-
stood to be the concern of individuals, "scattered independent actors who
are free to pursue their own subjective preferences,"3 and who as a re-
sult "enjoy a greatly heightened personal autonomy."3 They see democ-
racy as "a method for the attainment of liberty,"33 and in so viewing it,
turn on its head the classical view that it is freedom properly defined that
makes democracy possible.
Unfortunately, the modem individualist is no democrat. His hedonis-
tic narcissism, and the freedom society allows him to pursue it, suggest to
him that any restraint is a form of oppression, a denial of his "rights."
Such a person will do little to "keep in check that element of badness
which exists in each and all of us."34 Modem democracy, based upon
this mistaken and self-serving understanding of freedom:
tends to produce individuals who always prefer their private good....
Democratic citizens reject any rule about which they have had no say,
but the individualist rejects any rule he does not like. Individualists
would prefer not to be ruled at all and democracy can never be more than
a second choice.
35
The idea of individual liberty must be "kept subordinate to the demo-
cratic first principle, political liberty and equal citizenship. ' 36 A sense of
public-spiritedness must act to guide us in our understanding of these
concepts.
The classical idea of citizenship can also illuminate the concept of
equality, a proper understanding of which is also necessary to democ-
racy. Of the many threats posed to democracy by a lack of self rule (we
modems call it self control), perhaps the most dangerous is avarice. In
the ungoverned soul, the desire for money and possessions knows no
bounds. Lauded by present day defenders of capitalism as the driving
force behind men's actions, 37 the ancients understood it as the hallmark
of beasts, 38 resulting in the unequal distribution of property so dangerous
to democratic societies. Aristotle argued that it is the "duty of a truly
democratic politician ... to see that people are not destitute, for destitu-
30. See, e.g., Beckwith, supra note 8, at 3-6; BELLAH, supra note 3, at 142-63.
31. Beckwith, supra note 8, at 4.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. ARISTOTLE, supra note 18, at 241; Democracy and the Citizen, supra note 17, at 82-83.
35. BAKER, supra note 17, at 16 (emphasis in original).
36. Democracy and the Citizen, supra note 17, at 82.
37. The entire argument Mr. Beckwith makes presupposes this view of human nature. The fact
that he does not feel the need to explicity state it only indicates how much it is taken for granted.
Introductory economics texts are also good examples in this regard. See generally W. BAUMOL & A.
BLENDER, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY (2d ed. 1982); P. HEYNE, THE ECONOMIC WAY
OF THINKING (1973).
38. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, supra note 18, at 64, 74, 76, 77.
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tion is a cause of deterioration of democracy." 39 Prosperity should be
pursued, and "all that can be got from the revenues should be collected
into a single fund and distributed to those in need."'
The founders also recognized the challenges to republican government
posed by poverty. We have already touched upon Madison's views in
this regard. Thomas Paine, author of the influential "Common Sense,"
argued that the elimination of poverty could only come about by chang-
ing the institution of private property."1 Society, Paine argued, was "en-
titled to receive the surplus that men accumulated beyond their own
labor."4
Paine argued that a properly run government would give each person
reaching adulthood a sum that would allow them a decent start in life.4 3
Jefferson, sounding remarkably like Paine, stated that the rights of prop-
erty were not without limits. "Where there are in any country unculti-
vated lands and unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property
have been so far extended as to violate natural right."
44
It would seem that redistributive policies played an important part in
the founders' thoughts. Jefferson and Paine, among others, understood
that the equal exercise of political rights is dependent upon either limit-
ing or narrowing differences in wealth among citizens. Great wealth
makes men arrogant and gives them an illusion of self sufficiency. Pov-
erty, conversely, makes the poor resentful of the wealthy and destroys
the sense of dignity that democratic citizens need if they are to feel that
participation in public life matters. Without dignity, the poor "have no
reason to act responsibly" and they are likely to doubt whether anything
like a "common good" exists.
45
We can see, therefore, that more than just equal treatment before the
law is necessary for democracy to succeed. Equality of condition, or at
the least, a narrow inequality of condition is necessary as well. However,
as Aristotle pointed out, even this is a second best alternative, for,
"[e]ven if one were to fix a moderate amount for all, that would still not
answer the purpose; for it is more necessary to equalize appetites than
property and this can only be done by adequate education under the
laws."'46 Even better than redistribution as a boon to democracy is the
well governed soul in which avarice and greed have been brought to heel.
39. Id. at 246.
40. Id.
41. T. PAINE, Agrarian Justice, in THE LIFE AND MAJOR WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 605,
613-23 (P. Foner ed. 1974).
42. Id. at 605.
43. Id.
44. T. JEFFERSON, His POLITICAL WRITINGS 56 (E. Dumbauld ed. 1976).
45. BAKER, supra note 17, at 14-15; see also Democracy and the Citizen, supra note 17, at 84-85.
46. ARISTOTLE, supra note 18, at 74.
8
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 [1988], Art. 4
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol17/iss1/4
30 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
Such individuals seem ever more rare in our society. Their nurture and
cultivation is the concern of us all.
The preceding argument suggests why "wealth creation" is a futile,
unrealistic, and even hubristic means of alleviating poverty. Given the
boundless acquisitiveness of the anarchic soul, we could never "create"
enough wealth to satisfy man's insatiable greed. The sheer numbers of
people in America alone should give one cause to doubt such a solution
which would, it should be mentioned, entail the absolute subjugation and
exploitation of all of nature. A Godlike dream held by many in our time,
it is especially characteristic of those with a blind faith in the power of
modern technology. It is also an attitude that has directly contributed to
the environmental crisis we now face. The old maxim "those who have
get" provides us with yet another reason why "wealth creation" is no
solution to the problem of poverty. The legal profession would do well to
question those of its members who tout "wealth creation" as the "golden
rule" by which lawyers should shape their actions.
III. THE FOUNDERS AND THEIR REJECTION OF THE
CLASSICAL VIEW
The federalist and classical views on government differ on the issue of
man's nature and on that of the purpose or ends of political life. Man,
according to both Madison and Hamilton, is not by nature a political
animal. Nor is he virtuous unless compelled to be so. In the Federalist
No. 10, Madison argued that the causes of strife are sown into the very
nature of man and that men are more likely to "vex and oppress each
other than to co-operate for their common good."'47
Incited by differing opinions on religion or government and inflamed
by the unequal distribution of property, men will form mutually antago-
nistic factions with the stronger of them oppressing the weaker.48 Sound-
ing much like Thomas Hobbes who strongly influenced him, Madison
said that at such times "anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state
of nature where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence
of the stronger."'49 According to this new science of politics, people sub-
mit to government not in order to become virtuous, but out of fear for
their lives and the security of their possessions." Under this view, people
are "naturally free" with few, if any, obligations to their fellow men. 1
Taking the argument further, Madison and Hamilton proceed to a
more shattering assertion. Men, they said, cannot realistically be ex-
47. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (J. Madison).
48. Id.
49. Id. No. 51, at 324 (J. Madison).
50. Id. at 324-25.
51. See id. No. 10 (J. Madison); see also Baker, supra note 7, at 15.
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pected to control their passions or learn to govern their souls!"2 Hamil-
ton asserted that "the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of
reason and justice without constraint,"5 3 and Madison added that even
the wisest and best human beings are not exempt, for "[h]ad every Athe-
nian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have
been a mob."54
Those who take this view argue that government exists merely to chan-
nel and, if necessary, check man's natural propensities. People give up
some of their liberties in order to enjoy those they do not surrender. It
may be unfortunate that this is so, but men are not angels. If they were,
government would not be necessary for "what is government itself but
the greatest of all reflections on human nature?"55 To the modern indi-
vidualist, government "is always to some degree oppressive, since we give
up to it some of the liberty that is ours by natural right."56 Government
plays a delicate balancing act keeping men in line on the one hand and
allowing them the freedom to pursue their interests on the other.57
The federalists sought to achieve this balance in two ways. First, they
created a large nation-state under a federal government of considerable
power. This made it difficult for individuals to form factious alliances
with one another, leaving them alone and thus rendered more "timid and
cautious."58 Madison put it this way: "the society itself will be broken
into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens that the rights of
individuals or the minority, will be in little danger from interested combi-
nations of the majority."5 9
Second, the government itself was constructed so as to prevent any
person or group of "interested" individuals from creating a majority tyr-
anny. Working like a self regulating machine, the constitution was sup-
posed to produce good results even when its citizens and leaders were at
their worst.6 0 This, Hamilton thought, would often be the case, as "a
dangerous ambition.., often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for
the rights of the people .... "61 In our government, ambition would be
made to counteract ambition in a delicate system of checks and
52. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 110 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 55 (J. Madison); see also Democ-
racy & the Citizen. supra note 17, at 90.
53. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 110 (A. Hamilton).
54. Id. No. 55, at 342 (J. Madison).
55. Id. No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison).
56. Democracy and the Citizen, supra note 17, at 87.
57. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (J. Madison).
58. Democracy and the Citizen, supra note 17, at 91; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 105-
13 (A. Hamilton); id. No. 16, at 113-18 (J. Madison).
59. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 324 (J. Madison). For a discussion on Madison as a national-
ist, see J. Bauer, James Madison and the Revision of Republicanism in Post-Revolutionary America
(Apr. 12, 1984) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Dep't of Political Science, Duke Univ.).
60. BAKER, supra note 17, at 44.
61. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 35 (A. Hamilton).
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balances.62
Seeing themselves as realists, the founders felt it was not government's
task to make men virtuous because at heart they believed men to be inca-
pable of it. Government would protect individual libert r, thus elevating
to the first principle of our political life that concept of freedom which
came only second in the ancients' reckoning. 3
IV. NOT REPUBLICANISM BUT ARISTOCRACY
Following this accepted wisdom, it was recently argued in these pages
that "republicanism" was the "viewpoint of the American founders."'
This republicanism, the author tells us, was "consistent with the insights
of both the religious community and the economists., 6 To which econ-
omists and to what religious community the author is referring is never
made quite clear. In actuality, although the federalists paid lip service to
republican ideals, "[t]heir real concern was liberty, not republican gov-
ernment .... 66
In a departure from their otherwise consistent rejection of the classical
view of politics, the founders made a case for the favored participation of
"the better class of citizens" in public affairs. Plato argued that rule by
the "best" citizens (i.e., the noblest, most just members of society) was
superior to the rule by the many. Since the nature of justice, virtue, and
nobility are knowable primarily through philosophy, those citizens with
the time and inclination to engage in it would theoretically make the best
rulers.6 7 In a line of argument remarkably similar to this, Madison said
that in his time, those best suited to rule consisted principally of the
"freeholders," men of landed property.68 According to Madison, this
group of citizens possessed the necessary "merit" which would allow
them to "make decisions affecting the public good on the basis of reason
... rather than passion ... ."69 Landed wealth better suited men to rule,
because it gave them the means to educate themselves and education al-
lowed them to more consistently control their passions.70
Too much popular control of government was risky. The people are
62. Id. No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison).
63. Democracy and the Citizen, supra note 17, at 86.
64. Beckwith, supra note 8, at 6.
65. Id.
66. Democracy and the Citizen, supra note 17, at 86.
67. PLATO, supra note 4, at 375e-76e, 473e-503b.
68. J. Bauer, supra note 59, at 78-83.
69. Id. at 83.
70. The reader should recall in this context that at the time of the founding, formal education
was generally available only to those with the means to pay. The influence of the wealthy was
further augmented by limiting the right to vote to those with property. White women, Black men
and women, Indians, and most poor persons were all excluded from voting participation.
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often subject to "errors" and "delusions." 71 They often call for measures
which they later "lament and condemn."72 "In those critical moments,"
Madison said, "how salutary would be the interference of some temper-
ate and respectable body of citizens [who would] check the misguided
career and suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves
until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public
mind?"73
The unpredictable nature of the people thus makes "majority rule and
periodic elections prudent though not strictly necessary."'74 The landed
wealthy, Madison believed "would be the safest depositories of Republi-
can liberty."7 5 The founders had grave doubts about the ability of the
American people to rule themselves well. Madison's advocacy of some-
thing like an aristocracy of landed gentry stands "in stark contrast to the
republican contention that popular participation is the very definition of
liberty and just rule."
76
V. THE ROLE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND AN
IMPORTANT CONTRADICTION
Most of the founders, it is often noted, belonged to this "better class of
citizens." A list of them reads as a "Who's Who" of the period.
Madison, Mason, and Washington were prominent land holders. Others
were wealthy merchants. Significantly, lawyers were among the most in-
fluential of the founders. Hamilton, Morris, Randolph, Wilson, Patter-
son, and Jefferson were all prominent attorneys.7 7 As educated men,
attorneys were versed in both philosophy and theology. Steeped in the
classics, they were familiar with what the greatest thinkers had to say on
justice, virtue, and the purpose of civic life. They understood, for exam-
ple, what the uneducated of their day and the Ivan Boesky's 78 and
wealthy entrepreneurs of our day have never learned: that the truly mag-
nificent man reveals his character "in spending not upon himself, but on
public objects. His gifts are a sort of dedication" to the common good
and general welfare.7 9 Educated thus, lawyers were civic, moral, and in-
tellectual leaders who understood well that they had both a special obli-
gation to society and a place in the public eye.
71. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 384 (J. Madison).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Democracy and the Citizen, supra note 17, at 88.
75. J. Bauer, supra note 59, at 83-84.
76. Id.
77. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 6, at 625-735.
78. Boesky Capital Gains, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1986, at D4, col. 4; Id., Boesky's Holdings Put
As High As S200 Million, Nov. 19, 1986, at D8, col. 5.
79. ARISTOTLE, ETHICS 118 (J.A.K. Thomson trans. 1975).
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This special quality was recognized by no less an observer than Alexis
de Tocqueville. Writing early in our history, he said that in America,
lawyers are a privileged intellectual class." They represented the strong-
est barrier against the failings of democracy, checking and guiding its ill
considered passions. Possessed of a greater nobility and more even tem-
perament than their peers, lawyers were, for Tocqueville, the "political
upper class" and it was "at the bar or the bench that the American aris-
tocracy [was] found."81 As the "repository of civic virtue" Madison con-
sidered them to be in the first rank of citizens. 82 The common man,
inspired by the "manly and legitimate passion for equality" looked upon
members of the legal profession as models to be emulated. 3
In light of their aristocratic views, it seems plain that the founders
recognized at least implicitly, that one could not place absolute trust in a
mechanistic form of constitution or, for that matter, in the "invisible
hand of the market" as a way of insuring the maintenance of a represen-
tative form of government. They could afford this lack of trust because
other institutions existed which served a similar purpose. In addition to
the "better class of citizens, these other institutions included religious
and civic associations and the "mores" they engendered.84 Tocquevilie
placed great importance on these institutions and believed that as long as
they remained vibrant and public-spirited, they would help to keep de-
mocracy safe from the dangers posed by a too self-interested and priva-
tized citizenry."
Churches are in particular a good example of what Tocqueville meant.
He said that churches were among America's most important political
institutions.86 While the laws might allow the people to do almost every-
thing, "there are things which religion prevents them from imagining
and forbids them to dare."87 Religion and other forms of civic associa-
tion served to restrain the passions and helped men to feel less timid and
alone. These institutions, in other words, served as a means by which
modern men could learn to govern their souls in the way that the men of
80. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 268 (J.P. Mayer ed. 1969).
81. Id. at 267-68.
82. In so far as lawyers were of the privileged class, this would be the case. See J. Bauer, supra
note 59, at 80.
83. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 80, at 57. For a similar argument on the legal profession's
early view of its role, see Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLrriCs OF
LAW: A Progressive Critique 19 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
84. "Mores" or "moures" can best be defined as "habits of the heart." For Tocqueville, they
were a combination of accepted beliefs, customs, habits, and the like. Good institutions would pro-
duce mores that were conducive to a democratic culture. These institutions included the family,
churches, and civic associations. Compare this with the civic culture discussion. See infra text
accompanying notes 128-29.
85. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 80, at 277-315; see generally id. at ch. 9.
86. Id. at 292.
87. Id.
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antiquity did. Through direct self representation and association men be-
came noble, public spirited citizens whose hearts were habituated to good
rule. The founders hoped that institutions like these, combined with the
other devices they built into our form of government would be enough to
prevent democracy's deterioration.
In retrospect, it is plain to see that the founders' overall rejection of the
classical ideal of politics set forces in motion that were much too power-
ful for these institutions to handle. Among the first to recognize what
was happening, Tocqueville observed that our modem love of freedom
and individualism was leading men to behave in ways that were destruc-
tive to the very institutions on which democracy depended. 8 The pur-
suit of one's "economic interest" created in men an "increasing love of
well being" which made them "afraid of material disturbances."89 The
result was a love of "public peace" and tranquility which became the sole
political passion, destroying in citizens any feeling of public spiritedness.
In almost prophetic fashion, Tocqueville said: "I see an innumerable
multitude of men, alike and equal constantly circling around in pursuit of
the petty and banal pleasures with which they glut their souls. Each one
of them, withdrawn into himself is almost unaware of the fate of the
rest."90
Such citizens find the necessary task of exercising their public and
political liberties "tiresome." Too preoccupied with the pursuit of their
own fortunes, they have no time for public duties. Men like this believe
they are pursuing their self interest, but they have a "very crude idea of
it." 91 Unimpressed with the public sphere, such citizens (if that term can
still be used to describe them) are happy to "give the central government
new powers or to let it take them for it alone seems both anxious and able
to defend them from anarchy ....
For this and other reasons, individualism, private property, and the
pursuit of one's self interest through "open competition" are not institu-
tions which "insulate the individual from arbitrary concentrations of
power." 93 Actually, freedom understood in the modem sense (which Mr.
Beckwith adopts) leads to an accumulation of power by destroying the
very institutions and attitudes which work to prevent its being held in
ever fewer hands. By giving free reign and expression to the darkest
urges of the human heart, freedom and modem individualism destroy the
foundations of democracy by corrupting the souls of even the most pub-
lic spirited of citizens.
88. Id. at 503-09.
89. Id. at 671.
90. Id. at 691-92.
91. Id. at 540.
92. Id. at 671-72.
93. Beckwith, supra note 8, at 4.
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The legal profession was not immune to this malaise for with lawyers,
"as with all men, ' '94 self interest acts as a foil to public spiritedness. As-
saulted by the opinions and views of the great mass of citizens the legal
profession surrendered its claim to being a repository of civic virtue.
The power of public opinion to corrupt should not be doubted, for in
democracies it is a formidable force. Once the public has decided on its
views, there are no obstacles which can retard their general acceptance.
95
The majority uses no outright coercion to achieve its goals but "by some
mighty pressure of the mind of all upon the intelligence of each it im-
poses its ideas and makes them penetrate men's very souls.",
96
This power did not take very long to have its effect on the profession.
The historical record bears witness to a legal community ever less con-
cerned with justice, with individual lawyers viewing their profession not
as a calling or avocation, but as a mere means to the end of private
wealth. Private concerns came to dominate and replace public ones as
motivations to enter the profession. Thus, we see leading jurists and law-
yers of the period warning their peers that if the redistributive passions of
the masses were not checked they would "sweep away the nation's whole
social and economic foundation."97 In Joseph Story's view, it was the
profession's "glorious and not infrequently perilous duty" to "guard the
sacred rights of property from the rapacity of the majority."98
Fairness and substantive equality, once viewed as essential to the
maintenance of democracy and the very definition of "justice," came to
be viewed with suspicion, and only the legal profession "stood between
property and redistribution." 99 Abandoning a view of themselves as "the
priests at the temple of justice," lawyers became concerned with protect-
ing the rights and privileges of the wealthy capitalist class to which they
in increasing numbers belonged.
This change in the profession's self image was soon reflected in the
law. Contract law, for example, had traditionally been concerned with
the economic status of the contracting parties as a means of evaluating a
contract's fairness.' 0 Reflecting the increasing inequality of social rela-
tions under industrial capitalism, contract law dropped its concern for
the inequalities of economic power that might exist between contracting
parties.' 0 ' This made the body of contract law more amenable to the
94. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 80, at 264.
95. Id. at 248.
96. Id. at 435.
97. Mensch, supra note 83, at 20.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 25-26; see also Feinman & Gabel, Contract Law as Ideology, in POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 172 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
101. Feinman & Gabel, supra note 100, at 174.
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needs of the wealthy capitalist and served to legitimate the new order of
social relations.10
This course of events could not help but change the common man's
view of the profession. Lawyers, once respected and admired came to be
viewed with increasing cynicism by a public that was itself growing more
cynical about the ideals of justice expounded at the time of the founding,
and more corrupt as a result of their pursuit of the "petty and banal
pleasures" with which they had glutted their souls.'03
VI. CAPITALISM'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE DECLINE OF
THE PUBLIC SPHERE
The important part that capitalism plays in this overall picture should
be quite apparent. As an economic system, capitalism fits in quite well
with the political principles espoused by the founders. Individualism,
freedom, and a guaranteed right to private property are all necessary,
indeed essential prerequisites to a successfully functioning free market
system. The correspondence which various founders had with Adam
Smith made plain to them the nature of this political economy, and
Locke provided them with a theoretical basis for their enshrinement of
property as a natural and unalienable right in both the declaration of
independence"° and the constitution.105 This "enlightened" political
economy guided the founders and still serves as a basis for the views of
present day conservatives.'0 6
The founders' espousal of a "new science of politics" set in motion a
dynamic that undermined the civic and religious associations necessary
to the maintenance of democracy. Their adoption of a capitalist eco-
nomic system compounded the problem by destroying the habits of the
human heart which gave birth to these institutions and which were in
turn nurtured by them.
Capitalism relies on a "self interested" model of human nature. In and
of itself, this is not a problem for men do naturally seek their own good.
Problems arise, however, when the pursuit of one's economic self interest
is divorced from a set of moral values that prevent "self interest" from
becoming unbounded avarice. Adam Smith never intended economics to
be divorced from such a set of moral values. For Smith, wealth and
"wealth creation" were only a means to the realization of virtue and the
achievement of a truly "civilized life." 107 Never were they meant to be-
102. Id. at 176.
103. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 80, at 692.
104. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 327-44 (P. Laslett ed. 1965); see The Feder-
alist Nos. 10, 51, 57 (Madison) No. 19 (Madison & Hamilton).
105. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
106. See, eg., Beckwith, supra note 8; M. FREIDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1982).
107. See D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM xii (1978).
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come ends in and of themselves. Smith would most likely have agreed
with Aristotle in saying that: "As man is the best of all animals when he
has reached his full development, so he is worst of all when divorced
from law and morals."' 1 8 Various economic policies may offer them-
selves as means, Daniel Bell tells us, but they "can only be as 'just' as the
cultural value system shap[ing] [them]." a 9
Throughout capitalism's early history, the "economic impulse" was
constrained by a morality given to men by both classical and christian
thinkers. With the rise of industrial capitalism and a national, as op-
posed to a local economy, we witnessed the emergence of "a consump-
tion society" with an emphasis on "spending and material
possessions." ' This development undermined "the traditional value
system" with its Christian emphasis on charity, frugality, obligation to
others, self control, and impulse renunciation. 11 The result, Bell argues,
is that "[n]othing [is] sacred, [c]hange [becomes] the norm and the as-
cetic element [- once] a kind of moral legitimation of capitalist behavior -
has virtually disappeared."' 12 In short, capitalism, far from nourishing
deeply held norms, as Mr. Beckwith claims, actually undermines its own
moral and ethical foundations. 13
In an attempt to justify this state of affairs, today's conservatives offer
the pathetic excuse that capitalism has at least produced an abundance of
material goods and a high standard of living. Often, in search of a sort of
moral apology for the system, they attempt a vulgar reconciliation of
God and mammon.I14 Failing to recognize the antithetical nature of
capitalist and more traditional religious values, these attempts result in
the anarchy of logic and historical myopia that characterizes much con-
servative thought.
The dynamic produced by these contradictions has proved relentless,
and today almost all the institutions conservatives love are either extinct
or in disarray. Religion, for example, is in broad retreat, and as McWil-
liams points out, "the evangelical exceptions to the rule far from denying
the tendency, proclaim it fervently."" 5 Commerce has devoured local
communities and "reduced local regimes to a near impotence." ' 1 6
Rather than acting to check this process, our legal system furthers it,
demonstrating both its complicity in the dissolution of our political life
108. ARISTOTLE, supra note 18, at 29.
109. Id.
110. D. BELL, supra note 107, at 64-65.
111. Id.
112. Id. at xx.
113. Beckwith, supra note 8, at 5.
114. In this regard note the interplay of religious and free market views as mutual justifications
in Beckwith, supra note 8, at 1, 6, 22, 26.
115. Democracy and the Citizen, supra note 17, at 98.
116. Id.
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and the unself-reflective nature of its actions. Decisions such as NLRB v.
Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp.117 -in which the Court stated that com-
merce, "the plainest fact of our national life"1"' must determine the con-
stitutional order-speak to the point.
Our concern and alarm over this situation cannot help but be height-
ened when we recognize that the decline of these institutions is really
only symptomatic. The cause of their decline is the anarchy, greed, and
privatization of the human spirit that our blind adherence to capitalism,
individualism, and the doctrine of "self interest" has produced. This
more profound development will prove to be difficult to correct. Should
it go unchecked much longer, it may well prove impossible to correct.
We are currently evolving an individualistic ethic so extreme that it is
relativizing all of our moral, philosophic, and cultural values. The sensi-
bility of the 1960's and 1970's exemplified this emerging ethic with their
narcissism, childishness, delight in the absurd, and a "reversal of values"
which celebrated the "baser rather than the higher impulses." '119 The
Reagan administration's patriotic rhetoric and its attempt to create an
image of national renewal have not been able to conceal a sense of social
and personal meaninglessness that has grown to unprecedented propor-
tions. The resulting nihilism is reflected in this decade's suicide rate and
levels of substance abuse. This state of affairs has not been recognized
just by members of the academia. Many in our society are aware of it.
One popular artist has expressed his assessment of the situation in this
way:
I think you can get to a point where nihilism, if that's the right word, is
overwhelming and the basic laws that society has set up . . . become
meaningless. The forces that set that in motion [are] ... a lot of frustra-
tion, a lack of finding something you can hold on to, a lack of contact
with people .... That's one of the most dangerous things, I think, -
isolation. [My work] is about that isolation - what happens to people
when they're alienated from their friends and their community and their
government and their job. Because those are the things that keep you
sane, that give meaning to life in some fashion. And if they slip away and
you start to exist in some void where the basic constraints of society are a
joke, then life itself becomes a kind of joke . . . and anything can
happen. 120
Those left seeking fraternity and community feel trapped by the nihil-
ism they sense around them and have a difficult time overcoming the ever
more arbitrary values of our society. 121
117. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. 1 (1936).
118. Id. at 41.
119. D. BELL, supra note 107, at 121. On this topic see also C. LASCH, THE CULTURE OF
NARCISSISM (1979).
120. Interview with Bruce Springsteen, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 6, 1984 at 21.
121. In this regard, see R. BELLAH, supra note 3, at 84.
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VII. A DIGRESSION AND A RESPONSE
Up until now, I have not addressed the arguments made by Mr. Beck-
with in a detailed way. I trust that the reader will not feel overly put
upon. In my defense, I can only say that the preceding discussion was
necessary if the views forthcoming were to have the necessary founda-
tion. I have commented briefly from time to time on some of Mr. Beck-
with's views and the reader will have surmised that I have serious
reservations about them.122 There is much in Mr. Beckwith's article that
invites discussion, but for reasons of space and simplicity, I will limit my
attention in this section to the following issues: (1) his claim that capital-
ism is a necessary prerequisite to the establishment of political freedom;
(2) his belief that the founders operated under this assumption; (3) his
views on the purpose and goals of "liberal" academics; and (4) his dis-
tinction between "interpretivism" and "non-interpretivism." In the final
section, which follows, I will discuss Mr. Beckwith's views on the role
that lawyers should play in our society, contrasting them with my own
assessment of what is needed if the profession is to secure a viable future
for itself.
The first two issues can be dealt with simultaneously. In their zeal to
justify and legitimate capitalism, Mr. Beckwith and conservatives like
him try to convince us that capitalism is the source of our freedoms and
the summum bonum of our political life.12 3 The views I have presented
thus far suggest this to be a dubious achievement, but their position is
flawed for yet another reason. Namely, these claims reverse the direction
of cause and effect where politics and economics are concerned.
According to Mr. Beckwith, "As economic liberty contracts, so does
political freedom." 124 He tells us that socialism "usually begets the ex-
tinction of whatever political liberty existed previously," and that polit-
ical freedom cannot survive a "governmental monopoly of economic
power."1 25 In each statement, we see political freedom expanding or
contracting, living or dying, in response to the size and scope of the "free
market." The problem here is that political liberty and the governmental
institutions that guarantee itprecede capitalism and do not follow it. His-
torically, capitalism first appears in those countries with aprior commit-
ment to political and individual liberty. Creating one of the
122. I would like to make it clear that in so far as Mr. Beckwith's views reflect those of other
conservatives (which they do in large part), I am not responding to Mr. Beckwith alone, but to these
kinds of arguments generally.
123. The reader should keep in mind that for Mr. Beckwith, freedom means "doing as one
likes." This is important because capitalism is particularly good at helping people "do as they like."
Once this concept of freedom is challenged as problematic, the argument that capitalism is necessary
to freedom is called into question. See Beckwith, supra note 8, at 4.
124. Beckwith, supra note 8, at 4.
125. Id. at 2.
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contradictions that plague his work, Mr. Beckwith seems to implicitly
recognize this fact when he says: "Why in England at that time? Largely
because the legal guarantees of the common law and the flexible social
and cultural system ... encouraged risk taking .... ,12' An historical
analysis sufficient to support my views exceeds the scope of this essay.
However, I believe I can make my case through an inspection of Mr.
Beckwith's own assertions.
In trotting out the tired and misused examples of the Soviet Union,
China, Jamaica, and in short, all socialist systems as "proof" that social-
ism destroys liberty,127 Mr. Beckwith partakes of the same historical and
factual myopia of which he accuses the "non-interpretivists." Political
liberty is not something that springs into the human heart overnight. It
must be nurtured and cultivated over a period of time. There are impor-
tant and deep seated differences between a democratic or "civic" culture
and a non-democratic one.128 Almond and Verba state quite plainly that
"A democratic form of participatory political system requires as well a
political culture consistent with it."' 29 Furthermore, "What must be
learned about democracy is a matter of attitude and feeling, and this is
[hard] to learn."' 30 The establishment or demise of capitalism is not in
and of itself either necessary or sufficient for the establishment or denial
of political freedom. Throughout his article, Mr. Beckwith treats capital-
ism as a magic balm whose application produces material wealth and
liberty in all nations be they developed or developing.13 Nothing could
be further from the truth, for as Almond informs us, "the transfer of the
political culture of the western democratic states to the emerging nations
encounters serious difficulties." '132 It is plain that the people now under
the control of the Soviet, Chinese, Vietnamese, or Ugandan governments
never enjoyed a democratic culture. Socialism did not destroy some pre-
existing state of freedom for it never existed to begin with.
Also, Mr. Beckwith conveniently ignores any and all cases where so-
cialism and liberty coexist. Sweden, the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Nica-
ragua, and Spain come most readily to mind. Furthermore, Chile,
Guatemala and South Africa all have capitalist economic systems more
"laissez-faire" than our own, yet by what stretch of the imagination can
the people in these countries be said to be free? Mr. Beckwith's brand of
"non-interpretivism" has lead him to his own a-historical abstractions,
126. Id. at 3-4.
127. Id. at 3-6.
128. G. ALMOND & S. VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND DEMOC-
RACY IN FIVE NATIONS 1-20 (1963).
129. Id. at 63.
130. Id. at 64.
131. See Beckwith, supra note 8, at 3.
132. G. ALMOND & S. VERBA, supra note 128, at 3.
20
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 17, No. 1 [1988], Art. 4
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol17/iss1/4
42 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL
evidence of which can be seen in his shameless assertion that Chile's
democratic socialism was a "bitter experience" and that at least "living
standards are rising in contrast with trends as recent as a decade ago." 133
In short, political liberty and a democratic culture are not the products
of capitalism. There are both capitalist states without freedom and so-
cialist states with it. If anything, logic would indicate that political lib-
erty precedes the establishment of capitalism, for a liberal political order
guarantees the individual and property rights without which capitalism
cannot function. This view was also that of the founders, and can be
illustrated by examining their writings.
The objections raised to British rule were first and foremost political
ones. It was not taxes per se which bothered the colonists. They under-
stood that taxes were the price to be paid for British protection which in
turn "enabled them to travel, trade, and otherwise conduct business. 
'134
What the colonists objected to was the imposition of taxes without their
consent. The Declaration of Independence makes it clear that the foun-
ders objected to England's abrogation of those political freedoms without
which a person could not pursue his private interests.1 35 In the Federalist
Papers, Hamilton and Madison sought to justify the constitution by ar-
guing that it would guarantee those political freedoms necessary to "an
active commerce." 136 The problem with British rule was not that it did
not support a market approach to exchange, but that it unjustly took
from the colonists the fruit of their labor and that the king had refused to
"assent to laws the most wholesome and necessary for the public
good."'
137
I am not trying to create the impression that the views of the founders
and those of modern day conservatives are completely divergent. They
share a common view of man's nature, they both reject the classical view
of political life, and they both view government as being created to pre-
serve and protect "liberty" (individually and privately defined). The
problem with conservative interpretations of the founders lies in their
selective use of what the founders left us. The founders may indeed have
believed that man's innate tendencies could not be "transformed."'138 I
have demonstrated, however, that they did believe that some men, - by
virtue of their education - could transcend their base instincts and act in
a public spirited manner. Their skepticism about the prospects of good-
133. Beckwith, supra note 8, at 3-4. Note the fact that no supporting evidence for these flimsy
assertions is ever offered.
134. R. BAKER, G. POMPER, W.C. MCWILLIAMS, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 545 (2d ed. 1987)
[hereinafter AMERICAN GOVERNMENT].
135. See The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
136. THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 87 (A. Hamilton); see also id. Nos. 11-14 (A. Hamilton Nos.
11-13, J. Madison No. 14).
137. AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra note 134, at 627.
138. Beckwith, supra note 8, at 6.
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ness does not mean that they totally discounted it as a possibility. 139 In
rejecting the possibility of "redemption," or by claiming that only a di-
vinity can bestow it, Mr. Beckwith betrays just how completely the view
of human nature as base has come to dominate our collective self-image.
This view abandons much of western thought and the Judeo-Christian
tradition which Mr. Beckwith so reverently cherishes. Socrates and
Christ both taught us that men can overcome their base natures.' 40 For
the Christian, salvation rests on his doing so. Redemption, or at least
partial redemption, is of this world. To deny it, as Mr. Beckwith does,
not only denigrates the best that is in us, it is also, in my opinion, a
narrow if not a misconstruction of what the founders intended.
Mr. Beckwith's views on "liberal" professors are further evidence of
how completely capitalism has shaped our view of one another. No
longer able to imagine that anyone could be motivated by anything other
than "self interest," Mr. Beckwith argues that "non-interpretivist" or
"liberal" professors hold their views in order to further the creation of a
social order that would be run by them and in which they would achieve
the status they feel they deserve.' 4' Finding it either difficult or unneces-
sary to address their concerns, the author stoops to a ludicrous hyperbole
(non-interpretivism leads to genocide)142 and an ad hominem argument
(a belief in equality or redistribution makes one morally reprehensi-
ble).' 43 Mr. Beckwith tells us that liberal professors owe their positions
to the "affluence" and "security" that capitalism has created. 1 Presum-
ably, this is intended to point out to them the ingratitude and lack of
grace they demonstrate by criticizing the system. Given Mr. Beckwith's
position as a Professor of Law and the critical nature of his own essay,
this entire argument seems to me a bit like the pot calling the kettle
black.
Finally, I would like to remark upon Mr. Beckwith's use of the words
"interpretivist" and "non-interpretivist" and his assertion that "non-in-
terpretivist" theories are both "abstract" and "philosophical."' 14 1 Con-
cepts such as these have played a prominent role in recent conservative
thought. Attorney General Edwin Meese has stated in various forums
that judges and legislators should look to the intent of the founders as a
basis for their decisions. The connection between these views can be seen
in Mr. Beckwith's association of interpretivism with "the written text
139. There are many examples of the founders' recognition that the American people were of a
good character. See, eg., THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 384 (J. Madison).
140. See Matthew 5; John 3:16-22; Romans 1-8; See also PLATO, supra note 4, at 357b-58a, 366e-
67d.
141. Beckwith, supra note 8, at 10, 25.
142. Id. at 22.
143. Id. at 24.
144. Id. at 25.
145. Id. at 21.
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and ascertainable intent" of the founders,' 46 and "non-interpretivism"
with the "gossamer webs of moral philosophy and other ephemeral
sources ... ." 147
To my mind, these arguments rest upon what is at best a naive, and
what is likely a seriously uninformed philosophy of history. Early in this
essay, I discussed some of the problems associated with claims about the
intent of the founders. But the problems with Mr. Beckwith's views go
deeper than his selective reading of the founders or his omission of those
historical facts that prove troublesome to him. These problems are two-
fold. The first is his assumption that the meaning of history is obvious.
The second is his belief that the reasons behind the sequence of historical
events can be known with certainty.
Unfortunately for Mr. Beckwith, the answer to the question of the na-
ture and meaning of history is neither "straightforward" nor "unambigu-
ous."148 One need only compare the different meanings attributed to
history by Marx and Hegel (two of the greatest thinkers on history), to
appreciate the fact that just what history does mean is open to a widely
varying interpretation.149 The issue of what lies behind the sequence of
historical events is no less thorny a problem and is in fact intricately tied
to the question of what history is. But again, one need only compare, for
example, the Marxist explanation of the motive force of history (the in-
terplay of productive forces and productive relationships) to the Hegelian
(geist, mind, spirit) to the Greek (that there was no logical development
to events)150 to see that Mr. Beckwith's analysis of the events and histor-
ical forces at work at the time of the founding are not the only ones
possible.
As I have tried to demonstrate, egalitarian and redistributive views
were very much a part of the founders' thought. Both Paine and Jeffer-
son had doubts about an unlimited right to property. Daniel Shays and
his ill-fated rebellion indicate how wide spread these views were.15 1 Jef-
fersonianism (hardly an a-historical abstraction) favored both a broad
diffusion of wealth and debtor interests.1 52 There is, in short, ample his-
torical and textual evidence (since the written text is so important to Mr.
146. Id. at 20.
147. Id. at 21.
148. M. GILLESPIE, HEGEL, HEIDEGGER, AND THE GROUND OF HISTORY 1 (1984).
149. See Gillespie's analysis of these views for a detailed examination of this point. Id. His
entire work deals with the question of "What is history?" and should give one reason to doubt those
who claim absolute historical understanding.
150. See id. at 63 for the Greek view. See id. at chapters 3 and 4 for Hegel's views. See also
HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T. Knox trans. 1981). On Marx and history, see K. MARK & F.
ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY (C. Arthur ed. 1974).
151. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 6, at 115.
152. Id. at 123-24.
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Beckwith) to support views of the founders' intentions that are different
from those espoused in "What Should Lawyers Do?"
Mr. Beckwith seems concerned that theories not be too "abstract" or
"philosophical" (i.e., non-interpretivist). One might well ask how the
purpose of government and the character of human nature are to be dis-
cussed if not through philosophy? The founders certainly engaged in it.
Would Mr. Beckwith classify them as lacking "practical wisdom?"1 3 It
would seem he must. In fact, it is only through philosophy that certain
of the truths of our existence can be ascertained. Were we to be limited
to our experience or to "practical wisdom" we would likely end up like
the proverbial cat which, once it had sat on a hot stove, avoided cold
ones as well.
In the end, Mr. Beckwith and conservatives making similar arguments
are attempting to do what Marxists have long done. They interpret the
meaning of history so as to support their claims and deny its use to those
with perspectives they disagree with. In formulating his position, Mr.
Beckwith has had to make a most judicious use of the historical rec-
ord. 154 We could well ask of him the questions he addresses to his oppo-
nents. Has he been fair and truthful in his use of history? Do his
methods reveal an awareness of the historical illegitimacy of his views?
Does he have a history he can call his own?
VIII. FURTHER ASSESSMENT AND DISCUSSION
In concluding this essay, I would like to evaluate Mr. Beckwith's pre-
scriptions for the legal community and offer an alternative to them. The
legal community faces a crucial set of challenges and decisions. Given
the important function that lawyers play in our increasingly litigious so-
ciety, the path its members choose to take will determine more than just
the profession's future. It will be an important indication of the course
America will chart as well.
Mr. Beckwith's argument can be summarized as follows. Capitalism is
good because it guarantees and maximizes one's freedom to pursue one's
self interest.'55 Socialism is bad because it limits individual freedom and
cannot insulate people from "arbitrary concentrations of power."' 156 The
free market is superior to planned economies because of men's shortcom-
ings. Man's self interested nature makes capitalism itself "natural,"'
157
and his limited abilities mean that he cannot solve "the calculus prob-
153. Beckwith, supra note 8, at 21.
154. Id. at 22.
155. Id. at 4.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 2.
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lem" necessary to a successfully functioning planned economy. 158 Une-
qual rewards for those who show initiative are just, therefore those who
advocate redistribution are unjust, even "reprehensible."' 159 The only
proper course of action is the creation of wealth. This obviates the neces-
sity for redistribution because it raises the standard of living of the disad-
vantaged without taking from the wealthy the fruits of their labor. 160
From these premises, the conclusions are that the members of the legal
profession should work to further capitalism and protect property from
attempts to redistribute it. 16 1 This places the profession in the role of
protecting freedom. To help them in their task, lawyers should avoid
certain pitfalls and work to stop certain trends. They should avoid tak-
ing clients who are using the legal system to achieve redistribution. Law-
yers "have an ethical obligation to inform their clients of the economic
and moral consequences of redistribution."' 62 Lawyers should think
twice about working for a law firm or structuring a practice that services
redistributive claims. 63 Furthermore, lawyers have a duty to fight the
movement of both contract and tort law toward redistributive interpreta-
tions. Such interpretations have been encouraged by "anti-business, egal-
itarian media and intellectual elites."'" Mr. Beckwith concludes by
stating that lawyers should have faith in their "creator," "confidence in
themselves," and absolute faith that capitalism and wealth creation will
lead to an open and just society.
165
If the above can be said to be a fair synopsis of the views of both Mr.
Beckwith and other conservatives, then they really represent little more
than an ossified philosophic liberalism of the type Milton Friedman has
long championed.166 As a set of recommendations to guide the legal pro-
fession, they are a prescription for disaster.
"Ossified" aptly describes these views, for they form a rigid set of
precepts that are no longer conventional among most scholars. This
characteristic makes itself apparent in the assertion that "contract based
fee exchange" is indeed "free."1 67 The utopian fantasy of free individuals
who mutually and voluntarily engage in fair exchange bears no relation-
ship whatever to the realities of our existence.
Indeed, this view may never have closely corresponded with reality:
Gabel and Feinman have noted that even as early as the first half of the
158. Id. at 6.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 8-9.
161. Id. at 14-16.
162. Id. at 16.
163. Id. at 17-18.
164. Id. at 15.
165. Id. at 25-27.
166. See M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 106.
167. Beckwith, supra note 8, at 13.
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nineteenth century, the legal community altered the nature of contract
law so as to create "an imagery that made the oppression and alienation
[of the system] appear to be the consequences of what the people them-
selves desired."'
168
This new body of contract law did not take into account limitations on
the freedom of individuals resulting from economic inequality 169 and it
has served to hide or obscure the inequality of social relationships ever
since. "The legitimation of the free market was achieved by seizing upon
a narrow economic notion of freedom and equality and fusing it in the
public mind with the genuine meaning. ' ' 17 Tort law works in a similar
manner and is "intimately related to the rise of capitalism,"'' being very
important as a means of reinforcing capitalist and bourgeois ideology.
172
The lack of correspondence with social and economic reality that char-
acterizes these views can be seen in yet another way. They fail to take
account of the fact that the inequalities of power that make contracts
unfair are not often visible, and are empirically verifiable only with great
difficulty. Guided by mere appearances, advocates of "free market" ide-
ologies are quick to say: "No one forced the parties to sign," or "I didn't
see anyone with a gun to their head." Overt manifestations of power are
rarely, if ever, seen these days. Still, power has been brought into play
because the political and economic processes have been limited to those
subjects and methods which are not threatening to those who hold supe-
rior economic positions. 173 The legal system plays an instrumental part
in this, because it is used to define and legitimate values, norms, and
procedures in a way that predisposes the outcome of contractual negotia-
tions. This entire structure of norms and procedures becomes internal-
ized through the process of socialization, making it likely that most
citizens will not even consider options which threaten the interests of the
powerful.' 74
Mr. Beckwith provides his readers with a wonderful example of the
"a-historical" and "a-factual" argument he accuses his opponents of
when he informs us that capitalism and private property are institutions
which "insulate the individual from arbitrary concentrations of power"
and that the free economy "disperses power in a manner reminiscent of
the original intent of the American constitution."' 175 Given that no evi-
168. Feinman & Gabel, supra note 100, at 175.
169. Id. at 176.
170. Id.
171. Abel, Torts, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 186 (D. Kairys ed.
1982).
172. Id. at 194.
173. For a good exposition on power exercised in this way,see Bachrach & Baratz, Two Faces of
Power, 56 AM. POL. Sc. REV. 146, 147-52 (1962).
174. Id.
175. Beckwith, supra note 8, at 4.
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dence is offered in support of these abstractions, the reader has nothing
with which to judge their accuracy. What are the realities of the distribu-
tion of power in America?
One fifth of our population owns almost 60% of the corporate wealth.
One and six tenths per cent of the population owns 80% of all stock,
100% of all state and municipal bonds, and 88.5% of all corporate
bonds. Two hundred companies account for 80% of all resources used in
manufacturing. Five New York banks hold controlling shares of stock in
three-fourths of the top 324 corporations. On the other side of the scale,
the facts speak as plainly. One out of every four Americans is function-
ally illiterate. Almost thirty-three million Americans live below the min-
imum adequacy levels as determined by the United States Department of
Labor. Twelve million Americans suffer from malnutrition and hun-
ger.176 It would be easy to continue, but the argument that capitalism is
conducive to democratic liberties or that it leads to a dispersion of power
should be seen for the fantasies they are.
Economic inequality has made American democracy into a kind of
fiction.1 77 The inequality of wealth and power in modem America is
enormous, and "the framers of our Constitution could not have imagined
the distinctions between rich and poor that exist today." '178 Government
programs have reduced the effects of economic inequality but have not
eliminated it.'7 9 Conservatives often argue that the growth of the federal
government and federal involvement in the economy is "socialistic." In
fact, it is not socialism - at least not as socialists understand it.'8 ' It is a
form of state sponsored capitalism and as such represents "not the com-
munization of private wealth but the privatization of the common-
wealth!"'' Government planning and intervention in the economy is
often aimed at "the preservation and regulation of capitalism, not its de-
mise.""8 The corporate and political elite do not "check and balance"
one another. They "agree in broad terms about the way in which society
should operate."' 83 Although we are all technically "free" in that we can
speak our minds, vote, write letters and so on, we cannot "command the
public attention, amass the money for a major campaign, or influence
elections as effectively as those with more resources."'
' 84
The "paradox of the free economy" (as Mr. Beckwith wonderingly
176. M. PARENTI, DEMOCRACY FOR THE FEW 8 (3d ed. 1980). It should be noted that Mr.
Parenti often cites United States Government statistics.
177. AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra note 134, at 31-35.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. M. PARENTI, supra note 176, at 307.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 308.
183. AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, supra note 134, at 33.
184. BAKER, supra note 17, at 625.
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states) is not that it has produced "the restriction of the market for goods
and the redistribution of wealth by the force of transfer legislation."
185
Given the tremendous disparity in wealth and power in the United
States, and given the way that capitalism has perverted social relation-
ships, the true paradox revolves around the question of how the system
has managed to paint itself as democratic and command the allegiance of
so many people?
Should the legal profession continue in its present course, and follow
Mr. Beckwith's recommendations, the trends and problems I have out-
lined will continue to grow worse.
The legal community's defense of, and participation in, the privileges
of wealth has not gone unnoticed by their fellow citizens. It has led to
cynicism and self doubt, especially among those of our brethren who
have not shared in the wealth. This cynicism and loss of dignity is turn-
ing the current retreat of civic and religious association into a head long
rout. With their destruction, the barriers to an ever greater centraliza-
tion of power by corporations and government are being removed. Even
when these institutions manage to survive, they only infrequently work
to counter these values and instead are being increasingly shaped in their
image. This is justified by both the capitalist and "democratic" ethos of
our day on the grounds that "such institutions best serve society when
they provide a mirror reflection of it." ' 6 As institutions that, at least
potentially, provide people with the best answers to the question of life's
meaning, their decline will result in greater anomie, meaninglessness, and
nihilism.
IX. SOME PROPOSALS
Is there a solution? If so, what part would the legal community play in
it? I would like to argue in the space remaining that there is hope and
that it lies in a return to that understanding of politics and citizenship left
to us by the thinkers of antiquity. This proposal is not a call for a return
to some idealized past, a course of action of which thinkers on the right
are fond. It is, rather, a call for the reawakening and reaffirmation of the
best that is within us. It entails both an individual and collective act of
self-overcoming, and will necessitate a re-evaluation of our commitment
to capitalism as it is presently constituted, and of our individualistic,
privatized understanding of freedom. The legal community can and
should play a leading role in the transformation, recapturing for itself its
role as a repository of civic virtue and its place among the first rank of
citizens. I earlier raised the question of meaning and meaninglessness,
187
185. Beckwith, supra note 8, at 8-9.
186. C. LASCH, supra note 119, at 141.
187. See supra p. 40.
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and it is with this that I would like to begin.
Life must be meaningful in order to be satisfying. This assertion may
seem simplistic, even absurdly obvious. However, the fact is that Ameri-
cans have not given this issue the attention it deserves, and this is because
as a general rule we are not deep thinkers. The materialism and pragma-
tism for which we are known tends to make our thinking shallow and
often we let slip a disturbing anti-intellectualism. Nevertheless, the ques-
tion of meaning will not let us be, and attempts to ignore it only serve to
reinforce its presence.
Marx in his early writings argued that the characteristic that set man
apart from other creatures is his capacity for self-reflective conscious ac-
tivity. 88 The ability to act and to then stand back and evaluate the act,
comparing it with a previously thought out goal or standard is what is
meant here. In Marx's words, man unlike other creatures "makes his life
activity itself an object of his will and consciousness." ' 18 9 This human
power separates us from other animals because:
they produce [one sidedly] while man produces the whole of nature; ....
Animals produce only according to the standards and needs of the spe-
cies to which they belong, while man is capable of producing according
to the standards of every species and of applying to each object its inher-
ent standard; hence, man also produces in accordance with the laws of
beauty. 190
Time does not permit a complete description of Marx's analysis, but
his view of human nature necessarily implies that man is the only crea-
ture that can ascribe meaning to his activity.191 He does this by consider-
ing the ends or purpose of his actions and by assigning to them a
significance or import.192 However, not all ends or purposes are equally
meaningful or worthy because they do not equally allow us to develop
and make the fullest use of our specifically human capacities or powers.
In the ordering of man's activities some, such as eating, drinking, and
the like, are secondary in importance. Of first importance are art (aes-
thetics), science, and philosophy. These "first order" activities achieve
188. K. MARX, EARLY WRITINGS 328 (R. Livingstone trans. 1975).
189. Id. at 328. In this regard and also in relationship to what follows, compare ARISTOTLE,
supra note 18, chapters 1-3.
190. K. MARX, supra note 188, at 329.
191. I should make it clear that what immediately follows is not strictly Marx (except where
noted). It is, rather, an argument I developed that has its starting point in what I feel is implicit in
Marx's views.
192. This is the sense in which we commonly differentiate between activity that "makes sense"
and that which does not. Take for example, the common occurance of seeing someone engaged in an
activity we do not understand. We ask the person what he is doing and he or she informs us of his or
her purpose or ends. It is then that we come to an understanding of the significance (i.e., meaning)
of the activity. Note that knowing the ends or goals also allows us to evaluate the usefulness or
efficiency of the actions as well. But even this act of comparison is done wih a previously thought
out set of standards in mind.
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their importance because unlike the others they are specifically human
activities. As such, they best exemplify our human qualities. It is true
that eating, drinking, and procreating are genuine human functions. But
when they are "abstracted from other aspects of human activity"'193 such
as art, science, and philosophy, "and turned into final and exclusive
ends"'194 as is the case for many of our fellow citizens, "they are
animal."' 95 In other words, when our lives are reduced to simply "mak-
ing a living" or we become absorbed in the pursuit of "creature com-
forts," and do not pursue the first order activities that define our
humanness, we are in fact reduced to the level of mere animals. The end
of science is the examination and understanding of physical reality; 9 6 the
end of aesthetics, the understanding and assessment of the beautiful. 197
The end of philosophy is wisdom, through a knowledge of "the causes
and laws underlying reality." 198 These pursuits are worthy and noble, not
just because they develop our human powers to their fullest. They are
noble because they also provide answers to the great questions of man's
existence. Eating, drinking and the like are also meaningful, but are so
only in an instrumental sense. Most people do not really consider them
to be the purpose for which we exist. Art, science, and philosophy on the
other hand satisfy an innate need for answers to these questions, a need
generated within us by the very human power that allows us to seek for
such answers in the first place. By this argument, seeking answers to the
great questions of life is more than something we like to do - it is some-
thing we need to do. Both because our nature impels us to it, and be-
cause the act of answering these questions helps us to become fully
human. 199
At this point, the reader should recall that the Greeks took a some-
what similar view. The city state or polis was justified in part because it
allowed for the possibility of philosophy. It was through philosophy and
political participation that men both individually and collectively
achieved the good life. The ends of the individual life, the city, and of
philosophy thus became the same: virtue, nobility, justice, compassion -
193. K. MARX, supra note 188, at 327.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. AMERICAN HERIrAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 21.
197. Id. at 985.
198. Id. at 1162.
199. It is for this reason that an event like the destruction of the space shuttle touches us all so
deeply. The loss of life is, of course, tragic. But each and every day many more people are killed in
train or plane crashes. These events do not have the same effect upon us. Why? It may be that they
are in some sense "ordinary" and we are used to them. I think the reason we are so strongly affected
by something like the Challenger disaster is that the space shuttle is among the highest technological
achievements of man, and the goals among the most noble. When such an effort fails, it is in a real
sense humanity's failure, and as such we each feel the shock and burden of the failure personally. It
is, in short, a blow at our human self esteem and self confidence.
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in short - the good. The classic view of politics and of citizenship would
result in more than noble and just individuals who were public spirited.
It would result in men whose natures were fulfilled because the city al-
lowed them to explore (both actually, through practice, and theoreti-
cally) answers to the great or eternal questions of human existence. An
important point to keep in mind is that these answers were arrived at in
concert with others, in a communal, public fashion, and not individually
or privately.
It is plain to see how far we have come from this view of life and
politics. Radically individualistic and privatized, we tend to reject the
notions that men are noble and virtuous, that they can be altruistic as a
general rule, and even that they have a nature at all."° We define our
own morality, our own sense of justice. I have often had my sophomores
tell me during discussions on the topic: "I decide what is right and
wrong for me, and as long as I don't hurt anyone else, no one can tell me
I'm wrong." It is an interesting view, reflecting both the individually
defined morality mentioned above and the simplistic idea that hurting
another person is limited to directly inflicting physical or emotional in-
jury. Caught up in the "pursuit of the petty and banal pleasures with
which they glut their souls," ' failing to recognize "the close connection
between private fortunes and general prosperity,"2"2 they adopt this lim-
ited, closely circumscribed definition of responsibility. A broader defini-
tion would risk making plain the fact that their heady pursuit of wealth
and the moral code they construct to justify it hurts others in ways that
are all too real.
We should not be surprised that our souls are glutted with the desire
for "petty" and "banal" things, for our society offers us little that is
meaningful in so far as goals are concerned. When people are asked what
they want out of life their general response is either "happiness" or "liv-
ing well." ' 3 These responses are a direct reflection of what our society
offers as its rewards for hard work and obeying the laws. Alternative
answers to the question of life's meaning are left to either the churches,
the home, or the college philosophy seminar. Since these institutions and
others like them are becoming ever less viable in our society, the result is
that our values are being increasingly determined by special interest
200. This view, that men are a tabula rasa has come into prominence, especially among certain
psychologists and sociologists in the Post World War II era. See, e.g., LIGHT & KELLER, SOCIOL-
OGY (1985).
201. A. DE TOcQUEVILLE, supra note 80, at 692.
202. Id. at 540.
203. In conjunction with other research, I have often posed this question to my classes. The
overwhelming response is "I want to be happy" or "I want to have money, cars, a nice house," and
the like. When posed the question - "Well, what else?" I generally draw blank stares.
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groups, the advertisers, or the entertainment industry. Such institutions
are hardly the bastions of civic or moral responsibility.
Tocqueville understood the dynamic of our society in this regard. In a
materialistic society, he said, people will become engrossed in the pursuit
of wealth. What begins to matter is:
adding a few acres to one's fields .... enlarging a house.., keeping
irritations away, and satisfying one's slightest needs without trouble and
almost without expense. These are petty aims, but the soul cleaves to
them,. . . in the end they shut out the rest of the world and sometimes
come between the soul and God.2 4
Obviously, one must be concerned with obtaining the means of one's
subsistence. But as an answer to the great question of life's meaning, a
concern with physical possessions is ignoble and base. We would do well
to recall that in this regard Aristotle told us that the highest good is
"what is morally fine and just."2 °5 Material possessions may aid men in
pursuing this end, but they cannot in and of themselves be an end.20 6
Our economic system has tried to make wealth a final and even an exclu-
sive end, for people must value and seek after possessions if capitalism is
to work. But in the end, material wealth is not a sufficient goal for life.
It does not satisfy. It is interesting that the tremendous rise in the suicide
rate in the United States in recent years is occurring disproportionately
greater among the wealthiest and most successful members of our soci-
ety. This would at least open the possibility that the pursuit of material
prosperity as a life goal is a problematic one.207
Materialism is also a dangerous answer for democracy and democratic
citizenship. As Tocqueville knew, people who are concerned with physi-
cal pleasures and the pursuit of wealth will not "waste their precious
time" discussing public business.20 s Such people view the pursuit of lib-
erty as a threat to their prosperity.20 9 They fear anarchy and "are always
ready to jettison liberty in the slightest storm."210 We should not forget,
Tocqueville told us, that:
it is through good order that all peoples have reached tyranny. That is
certainly no reason for nations to despise public peace, but they should
not be satisfied with that alone. A nation which asks nothing from the
government beyond the maintenance of order is already a slave in the
bottom of its heart. It is a slave to its prosperity and the road is free for
204. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 80, at 533 (emphasis added).
205. ARISTOTLE, supra note 79, at 27.
206. Id. at 35-50.
207. See The Strange Agony of Success, N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1986 at Fl, col. 2; Almost One in
Five Have Mental Disorder, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1984, at Al, col. 1; Suicide A Growing Problem
Among Young Men in US., Durham Morning Herald, June 21, 1985 at A8, col. 1; DelBelo, Needed:
A U.S. Commission on Teen Age Suicide, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1984, at 31, col. 1.
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the man to tie the fetters.
2 1
It seems plain that the pursuit of one's own good does not necessarily
produce a healthy public order, as classic economic liberalism believed it
did.
In a like manner, a generalized goal of "happiness" is insufficient as an
answer. In this case, it is less a problem with the goal than with the
generality of the term. A rapist or child molester is "happy" as a result
of his acts - but is this a worthy happiness? Americans try to achieve
"happiness" largely by pursuing material prosperity. But in the end,
happiness (as Plato and Aristotle told us), is best achieved through a
pursuit of the good (i.e., the noble and just), and the road to this end is
not the hoarding of possessions, but an active participation in political
life.212
A return to the classical view of politics outlined in this essay would,
in my opinion, go a long way toward solving some of the problems we
face. Justice and public virtue, not material wealth, would be its primary
concern. As such, it would be more likely to produce public spirited
citizens as opposed to radical individualists. It would also result in the
pursuit of ends or goals (virtue, nobility, justice) which would provide
meaning in life, leaving us with more complete, fulfilled, human beings,
and reducing the meaninglessness and nihilism that increasingly charac-
terize our society. Finally, it would also work to bring about the equali-
zation of appetites which Aristotle thought necessary if avarice and greed
were to be brought to heel. It will be a difficult task to accomplish, for
"To make individuals out of citizens is easy, to make such individuals
back into citizens, nearly impossible.
'2 13
In order to achieve these goals we will have to re-create citizens and
re-invigorate our politics. As a first step we will have to abandon our
view of human nature as being primarily self interested. Doubtless this is
part of our makeup, but we can no longer afford to operate under the
assumption that it defines us. As did the ancients, we will have to believe
that all are capable of virtue, and that they can learn to control the urge
to pursue base or petty pleasures. People also need to recognize that the
pursuit of meaningful answers to the eternal questions of existence is not
just the work of philosophers or intellectuals. It is a human need which
we ignore at the cost of our own alienation and nihilism. Our current
image of man must come to be recognized for what it is: a product of our
socialization, fostered by capitalism as a means of justifying and legiti-
211. Id.
212. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 79, at 25-50; ARISTOTLE, supra note 18, at 25-54; PLATO, supra
note 4, at 145.
213. B. Barber, The Real Lesson of Amerika, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1987 at 25, col. 2.
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mizing its own existence.214
As part of this re-education, we will have to learn to reject those argu-
ments which seek to justify the status quo, and especially those which
attempt to do so through appeals to religion. Mr. Beckwith is one of the
many who use religion in this way. His argument that men are led by
"sin" and "self interest" into error and that this possibility of error
makes the anarchy of the free market necessary is a case in point. 15
This does not mean that we need to ignore all of religion's insights.
The belief that men can better themselves through an act of "self over-
coming" is a lesson that can inspire us in our quest to achieve virtue,
public spiritedness, and a revitalized political order.216 Faith in the
power of people to achieve goodness is among the best of the teachings
that religion has to offer us. We should accept such teachings or views of
religion and reject those which try to make of religion an obstacle to a
better world.
It is likely that we will also have to re-evaluate our present understand-
ing of freedom. In the first place, it is a hollow definition. In a society as
technologically advanced and integrated as ours is, one's freedom to do
almost anything depends almost entirely upon others who must perform
their assigned tasks. We are "free" in only a limited sense, because it is a
dependent freedom easily (and often) impinged upon when others fail at
the jobs we expect them to perform.217
Secondly, it is an understanding of freedom that is dangerous to de-
mocracy. It makes men "forget their ancestors," "isolates them from
their contemporaries" and shuts men up "in the solitude of [their] own
hearts. ' 21 8 Our current understanding of freedom works in the interest
of capitalism, is encouraged by it, and as Benjamin Barber recently said,
it leaves Americans:
more concerned about enlarging their private sphere of happiness than
invigorating the public sphere in which civic freedom flourishes. They
confront without a murmur the wholesale privatization of their country,
the selling of the public trust into private hands, the transfer of public
tasks (prisons, hospitals, schools) to private profit groups, the redefinition
of public responsibilities (welfare, support for the arts) as private
functions.2 19
We need to redefine freedom in a public as opposed to a private way.
214. On this see I. MESZAROS, MARX's THEORY OF ALIENTION 89-91 (1982); see also J.
ISRAEL, ALIENATION FROM MARX TO MODERN SOCIOLOGY (1971).
215. Beckwith, supra note 8, at 6.
216. On this issue see Romans 7, 8, 12:1-2; John 3:1-15. For a more secularized version and
explanation see W. KAUFMAN, NIETZSCHE: PHILOSOPHER, PSYCHOLOGIST, ANTICHRIST 16, 57,
200-07 (Vintage Books, 1968).
217. I am indebted to W.C. McWilliams for these insights.
218. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 80, at 508.
219. B. Barber, supra note 213, at 25.
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Freedom should once again mean having a meaningful say in the affairs
of state, and in defining the public's alternatives.22 °
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, we will have to recognize that
equality is at least as important as liberty for the maintenance of a demo-
cratic regime. As a basis for community it is more than a necessary con-
dition it is an essential one.22 1 The reader will recall the reasoning of
Aristotle on the need for equality in a democracy. There is no need to
repeat it. However, I would like to say a few words about equality and
community.
It would seem that community is important. Certainly, in Toc-
queville's view it was, for he saw it as one of the obstacles to majority
tyranny. Americans continue to both value it and seek after it even as it
is fading as a way of life and as a political institution. We have touched
upon some of the reasons for this decline. The size and complexity of our
economy have made communities powerless to determine their destinies
in any practical way. As their importance has faded, so too has people's
allegiance to them.222 Capitalism has worked to undermine some of the
values upon which community rests (e.g., compassion, cooperation), and
moreover, our present understanding of freedom is directly hostile to
community.223
Community (and for that matter marriage) requires sacrificing at least
some of our freedoms. We may have to curb our actions at times if we
are to maintain the standards or values upon which these relationships
rest. To make community (or marriage) work, we cannot always "do as
we like." This is an important reason why both community and mar-
riage are troubled institutions in contemporary America. As current
trends all too painfully indicate, people often sacrifice their communities
or their marriages for the sake of their freedom. Loneliness and aliena-
tion are often the price they pay, and freedom becomes (in the words of
the popular song) "just another word for nothing left to lose." Bred on
freedom and individualism, we only, with difficulty, reconcile these con-
flicting demands. To the extent that we are able to re-define freedom, we
may improve this state of affairs.
There is a further problem, and it lies in yet another failure to recog-
nize what is necessary for community. Community, if it is to work, must
be based upon a sense of the equal worth and dignity of all individuals.224
This sense rests upon an "intrinsic" understanding of equality, and re-
220. BAKER, supra note 17, at 10.
221. See W.C. McWilliams, On Equality as the Moral Foundation for Community, in THE
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 183 (R. Horowitz ed. 1978).
222. See BAKER, supra note 17, at 24-25.
223. See McWilliams, supra note 221; Democracy and the Citizen, supra note 17.
224. See McWilliams, supra note 221, at 185.
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jects the importance of external manifestations of difference.225 In fact,
"The belief in human equality is necessarily at odds with empiricism or
positivism. It demands a radical depreciation of appearances and insists
on a distinction between humanity's essential equality and its differing
accidental manifestations. ' 226 Today, we tend to deny that men are in-
trinsically equal. Though we pay lip service to equality, we tend to judge
people according to how well they manifest their "worth. '227 We esti-
mate a person's value as a worker, or husband, or mother, and judge
them accordingly. No mere colloquialism, it is yet another dramatic ex-
ample of the extent to which capitalism's values have come to dominate
our patterns of thought and our view of one another. Furthermore, this
de facto inequality is not mitigated just because "society encourages me
to demand, at least, the external validation of equal treatment as a proof
of my equal worth.1228 If we are to revitalize community in America, it
will be important to ground our idea of society in a theory of the intrinsic
commonality of all men.229 My earlier discussion on those powers that
define us as human230 is relevant here. I feel that this theory provides
such a grounding. It allows for apparent differences in competence or
ability while positing the existence of an inner quality and potentiality
which all humans share. This inner quality would serve as the basis upon
which we could recognize our mutual humanity and accord to one an-
other the dignity and respect that such a recognition requires. This
grounding or one like it would seem to be necessary if community is once
again to be placed on a sure footing. As institutions, communities are
large enough to provide the possibility of political control and small
enough to maintain the dignity of the individual. 231 This would seem to
more than justify our efforts to revive and maintain them.
At this point it might be worthwhile for me to sum up my argument.
The classical view of political life was quite different from our own. To
the ancients, equality, liberty, and individualism were all defined and un-
derstood in connection with an understanding of citizenship much
broader and demanding than our own. The founders rejected these views
in favor of a "new science of politics." In this view, the individual and
his private concerns became the focus of socio-political life and the best
form of government was a limited one which would not attempt to create
civic virtue but would merely guarantee individual liberty.
Capitalism fit well into this scheme but its adoption only helped to
225. Id. at 184; see also BAKER, supra note 17, at 615-29.
226. Id. at 189.
227. Id. at 187.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 187-89.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 194-99.
231. BAKER, supra note 17, at 615-29.
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undermine those traditional institutions (community, family, civic associ-
ation), and those traditional values (compassion, charity, frugality, self
denial) which kept in check the avarice and radical individualism of the
human heart. These characteristics have now achieved a position of as-
cendancy in our society. The result has been a relativization of values,
meaninglessness, purposelessness, and alienation which pose a grave
threat to our democracy.
The founders had hoped that a "better class of citizen" would work to
maintain civic virtue and our democratic politics. The legal community
formed an important part of this group. But the emerging capitalist
ethos quickly took hold of the profession's members, many of whom
soon gave up the pursuit of justice, equality, and fairness in favor of a
radically self interested ministering to the needs and requirements of cap-
italism. This has only served to exacerbate and deepen the current crisis.
Current thinkers such as Mr. Beckwith attempt to rationalize, justify,
and even further this course of events. Mr. Beckwith and his supporters
do this by narrowly interpreting our history, by claiming that en-
trepreneurial lawyers help maintain traditional values, and by arguing
that attempts to achieve substantial equality and a true broadening of
democracy will lead to the disastrous end of socialism. To my mind,
these arguments are more than just self serving. They rationalize and
justify the greed of many lawyers, lead to a worsening of our politico-
economic crisis, and will only serve to make ever closer in the public
mind the relationship between the legal profession and our increasingly
oppressive and meaningless politics.
Solutions do exist, but are likely to require a re-thinking of our current
understanding of the law and of our commitment to capitalism. In my
view, these solutions must entail a re-creation of meaningfulness by mak-
ing clear the ends or purpose of our civilization. These ends need to be
defined in a secular, humanistic, and noble fashion, and should be arrived
at through communally based moderately sized institutions and not
individuals.
In concluding this essay, I would like to discuss the part which the
legal profession could play in this. It seems to me that members of the
profession must choose between a career that both supports and partakes
in the existing state of affairs and one that will help to bring about the
kinds of changes which both myself and others have tried to argue are
necessary if we are to preserve our democracy. Frankly, I am very pessi-
mistic as to whether the necessary changes will occur. Like Shakespeare,
I believe that "Diseases desperate grown are by desperate appliance re-
lieved, or not at all." '232 If nothing else, I feel we are indeed in desperate
232. W. SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET THE PRINCE OF DENMARK, Act III, scene 4, line 206.
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straits, and I am not at all sure that incremental or moderate changes
will suffice. This is especially true given the tremendous imbalance of
power that exists between those who benefit from the system and those
who seek to change it. One cannot blame the faults of the system on bad
individuals, or lapses of memory, or on isolated mistakes. I have tried to
show that it is the system itself that is at fault, and the problems begin
with its basic assumptions. In some of this, I differ strongly with many
of those I have thus far relied upon to support my arguments.
If this assessment is accurate and radical measures are resorted to, the
profession will stand to lose much. In the minds of many Americans, it
is already closely identified with the present structure of political and
economic power. This is an accurate perception, as the greed and self
interest of many in the profession has led them to support and defend the
system. Whatever fate the system would suffer as a result of radical
change (from either the left or right), the profession can be sure that it
will share in it. However, let us for the moment be optimistic and sup-
pose that incremental changes can provide a solution to our difficulties.
In such a scenario, the legal community could well find itself admirably
positioned to play a leading role. Of course, education as a means of
changing values (especially in the young) would be one primary concern.
But the other chief means of change would be through the law itself. The
laws have a powerful effect on the behavior of people. Time assures this
effect, for even though the current generation objects to changes in the
law, they are eventually replaced by a new generation, who, having been
educated in the law, takes it as a given. "The spirit of the law, born
within schools and courts, spreads little by little beyond them; it infil-
trates through society right down to the lowest ranks, till finally the
whole people have contracted some of the ways and tastes of a
magistrate.
233
As makers and interpreters of the law, the legal profession is well situ-
ated to mold it so as to encourage and promote the view of citizenship,
community and political life outlined above. This will take some cour-
age, for it will likely mean learning to think about some of our funda-
mental "rights" in new and unusual ways.
We may, for example, have to limit the ability of people to use their
wealth to influence public policy. We do this presently, but what is
needed is an even more extreme restriction of property rights. What I
have in mind is the complete public financing of all elections with no
private contributions allowed. This would not only open up the possibil-
ity of public office to more Americans and thus improve democracy, but
would also help put an end to the political power of special interest
groups and wealthy businessmen. In a like manner, we could use the tax
233. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 80, at 270.
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system to encourage community instead of discouraging it as we now
do. 34 Instead of providing a deduction for moving expense, we should
remove it, and provide a deduction for staying in one's home. It could be
scaled so that the longer one stays, the greater the deduction. This would
have the effect of discouraging mobility (something clearly not in the
interests of corporations) and encouraging the setting down of roots and
the maintenance of community life. Changes in first amendment guaran-
tees of free speech may also be necessary if we are to prevent advertisers
from hiding behind the first amendment while practicing insidious forms
of psychological abuse. Were a person in a marriage to engage in prac-
tices similar to those used by advertisers, there would be grounds for
divorce on the basis of "mental cruelty." The protection of future gener-
ations might well mean extending this concept of cruelty to involve forms
of speech we now consider exempt.
Members of the profession are not likely to play such a role or seek
laws which encourage a reinvigorated politic unless they are educated to
see the necessity and wisdom of it. To this end, we need to continue to
encourage what Mr. Beckwith calls "interdisciplinary approaches to
legal scholarship. ' 235 Lawyers need an adequate background in philoso-
phy and ethics and should be encouraged to enroll in such courses at the
graduate level as a part of the law school curriculum. They need to un-
derstand well the law's relationship to its philosophical origins (with the
classical views being stressed) and to the political and economic system
as well. This should all be a central part of legal training, even if it would
mean a four, as opposed to a three year curriculum. The critical legal
studies school is representative of the broader understanding of the law
and its relationship to society that can result from such a course of
instruction.236
Can the law be radical? Lawyers at least must answer this question in
the affirmative, especially if they hope to play a leading role in changing
our system for the better. They need believe that:
any legal system, including a legal system in a capitalist society, carries
with it large components of equity and justice that can provide some de-
gree of protection to the masses of people that provide a platform from
which further progress can be made, and that also provide a vision of
social justice that inspires action.237
If members of the profession can find it within themselves to use their
234. I am indebted to Carey McWilliams for this example. See also Democracy and the Citizen,
supra note 80, at 101.
235. Beckwith, supra note 8, at 23.
236. As is exemplified in the worthy scholarship of its members. For example, see source cited
infra note 237.
237. V. RABINOWITZ, The Radical Tradition in the Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PRO-
GRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairy ed. 1982).
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knowledge and power to promote citizenship, nobility, virtue, equality,
and justice, then hope remains. Should they seek their own self-interest
and follow the accepted wisdom as a means of justifying it, both we and
the profession are in trouble, for our current predicament will grow
worse. It is worth keeping in mind that:
If American democracy falls, it will not fall to collaborators in SS
uniforms or anonymous totalitarian bogeymen. Rather it will slide into
the hands of some reluctant oligarchy or an overzealous domestic party
without foreign connections that will assume power by default because
the public has inadvertently abjured its citizenship.
2 38
At present, the profession on the whole still seems concerned more
with the bottom line than with justice. It has only itself to blame for this
widespread perception. However, whether or not the profession can re-
form itself, is still an open question. The possibility that it can still exists.
Redemption may be possible through an act of "self overcoming" such as
has been referred to. Success at this would truly be something worthy of
emulation, and would more than justify placing such individuals once
again among the first rank of citizens. We have even more reason for
hope, given that some in the profession have always sought a virtuous
and meaningful politic and have always taken seriously their position as
"priests at the temple of justice." Members of the profession must learn
to recognize that the pursuit of substantive equality and fairness is an
important part of their heritage. Making them the goals of one's profes-
sional life is not a betrayal of the profession's purpose, but a reaffirmation
and a reclamation of it. Should the profession's members be swayed by
the self interested arguments of conservatives and adopt the views of Mr.
Beckwith as its "raison d'etre" then the likelihood of radical solutions to
our problems will have been made more certain. Should this happen, the
question will no longer be "What Do Lawyers Do?" but rather "What
Shall We Do With Lawyers?"
238. B. BARBER, The Real Amerika, supra note 211, at 25.
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